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Abstract
An equilibrium model of bidding behavior is developed that accounts
for observed fluctuations in the degree of competition to acquire
offshore petroleum leases. As one might expect, such fluctuations
are related to the heterogeneity of geological prospects that are
offered for sale, with a relatively high degree of competition to
acquire tracts of the highest quality. The equilibrium configuration
of bids is also shown to reflect structural characteristics, such as
capital market constraints, that may restrict competition in the
lease auction. Empirical evidence is presented which tends to confirm
our general theory of bidding equilibria, but which contradicts the
popular notion that capital constraints have restricted competition
in OCS lease sales. Policy implications are discussed in the
concluding section.
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EQUILIBRIUM PATTERNS OF COMPETITION IN OCS LEASE SALES
1. Introduction
In this paper we develop an equilibrium analysis of bidding
behavior that accounts for patterns of competition observed in Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) petroleum lease sales. As one would expect,
the equilibrium configuration of bids that obtains in this market is
related to the heterogeneity of geological prospects that are offered
for sale; with a relatively large number of bids concentrated on
tracts of the highest value. However, the equilibrium configura-
tion may also reflect structural characteristics, such as capital
market constraints, that restrict competition in the auction market.
The influence of these factors on the configuration of bids is des-
cribed below. We also examine some empirical evidence which tends
to confirm our general theory of bidding equilibria, but contradicts
the popular notion that capital constraints have restricted competi-
tion in OCS lease sales. Some policy implications of these results
are discussed in the concluding section.
2. Relation to Previous Studies
A lease sale consists of the simultaneous letting of many indi-
vidual tracts by the method of competitive bidding. Each participant
in the sale is invited to submit bids for those tracts it desires.
Petroleum development rights are subsequently awarded to the highest
bidder. A common outcome of the auction is that many of the tracts
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receive few, if any, bids; while others are hotly contested by the
auction participants. A uniform degree of competition for respective
tracts is most unusual.
Several previous studies have suggested that the underlying quality
or geological potential of an offered tract is a primary determinant of
the number of competitors it will draw. For example, Gaskins and
Teisberg [1976] explore a game-theoretic model that determines the
winning bidder's profit as a function of the tract's inherent value
and the number of bidders competing for it. They define and identify
an equilibrium number of bidders by increasing the degree of competi-
tion for the tract until expected profit falls below the cost of
preparing a bid. The bidding models of Rothkopf [1969] and Wilson
[1976] may, in principle, be similarly manipulated to determine the
number of bidders required to dissipate expected profit and forestall
additional competition. Although these studies focus on the sale of
a single tract, they suggest a useful method of characterizing the
spatial distribution of bids when multiple tracts are offered, as
discussed below.
When several tracts are offered simultaneously, a bidder will
generally not be indifferent regarding the choice of specific tracts
on which to enter bids. For example, a large and promising geologi-
cal structure which underlies a shallow water tract may offer the
potential for considerable profit and attract many bidders. However,
we cannot expect less promising tracts to be neglected entirely,
because alert firms would recognize that against no competition even
lower quality properties can be acquired on a profitable basis. Thus,
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it is reasonable to expect a pattern of competition to develop that
equilizes profit opportunities among all offered tracts and renders
potential bidders indifferent regarding the tracts on which their bids
are placed. A spatial distribution of bids that does not equalize
profit opportunities cannot be in equilibrium since participating
firms would have an incentive to redirect their bids.
3. Theoretical Framework
It is possible to define and describe equilibrium bidding patterns
within the context of a formal model of the auction market. We assume
that T distinct tracts are offered, and that these tracts constitute
independent investment opportunities.1 The tt h tract is characterized
by its petroleum reserve volume, Rt, and associated net economic
value, Vt. Although we will proceed as if Vt and Rt were known with
certainty, they could be construed as anticipated or expected values
without changing the nature of the results.
The number of competitors for the tth tract is denoted by n t, and
the expected value of the winning bid by Bt(nt). The relation between
these two variables could be determined from an explicit formulation
of the appropriate bidding game, but rather than adopt any particular
formulation we stipulate only that the expected winning bid increase
as a proportion of tract value when the number of competitors grows:
1The introduction of covariances would complicate the analysis con-
siderably, without shedding additional light on the nature of the
competitive equilibrating mechanism.
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(1) Bt (n) = g(n).V t
with: g'(n) > 0.
This formulation is consistent with the game-theoretical bidding models
of Vickrey [1961] and Rothkopf [1969], but still restrictive in that it
requires the winner's share of economic rent to be independent of the
magnitude of the tract's value.1
Finally, we assume the participants in the auction to be equally
well-informed and identical in their application of bidding strategies.
Consequently, the probability that each of the nt competitors will be
declared the winner is precisely l/nt.
The expected profit, lHt, anticipated by a potential bidder on the
t tract can now be written directly as a function of the hypothesized
degree of competition to obtain it:
V t [1 - g(n t )]
(2) t (nt) = t t = 1, ... , T.
t t n
t
For a particular pattern of competition (nl, ..., n T) to constitute an
equilibrium among expected-profit maximizing firms, it must succeed in
reducing the expected profit on. each tract to a common value. Thus,
competitive equilibrium requires, using Equation (2):
ni Vi 1 - g(ni)
(3) - = for all i and j.
n. Vj 1 - g(nj)
It is possible to relax this restriction considerably without altering
the nature of our results. For example, we could incorporate the
"flinching" hypothesis, which states that, ceterus paribus, increases
in tract value inspire less than proportionate increases !r the vaLuo-
of the winning bid. The details of this are tufJt. side.
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The bidding pattern characterized by Equation (3) reveals the
direct influence which heterogeneous tract values exert on the con-
figuration of bids. It is apparent upon inspection that a pattern of
uniform competition (ni = n) will fail unless all offered tracts are
of equal value, which is unlikely. In equilibrium, tracts of greater
value must attract greater competition.
The equilibrium configuration of Equation (3) would not apply to
the bids of firms who face constrained opportunities. In particular,
if firms face capital constraints which limit the total dollar volume
of bids tendered by each, then the equilibrium must be formulated not
in terms of absolute profit potentials, but in terms of profit per
dollar of the bidding budget expended on respective tracts, Ht/Bt.
Thus, we require, using Equations (1) and (2);
n. g(n.) 1- g(n.)
(4) - ; for all i and j.
n0 g(nj) 1 - g(n i )
Equation (4) portrays the configuration of bids that would obtain
under a regime of budget-constrained bidding. A pattern of uniform
competition is the only configuration that generally satisfies the
equilibrium condition, in spite of the heterogeneity of offered tracts.
This result is in sharp contrast to the pattern of unconstrained
bidding behavior derived above.
Finally, we consider firms that operate subject to a physical,
rather than financial, constraint. Specifically, we consider firms
whose bidding activity is confined to a limited volume of petroleum
reserves; for example, a firm that elects to tender bids on no more
1This is analogous to the rate of return criterion applied in other
capital budgeting problems.
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than 50 million barrels of reserves. Such constraints have not been
discussed in the literature, but they would apply to firms that maintain
target reserve levels, or to those constrained by a limited geological
and managerial staff available to appraise offshore prospects and formu-
late appropriate bids.
If bidders do face physical constraints of this type, we must again
revise the equilibrium condition. Profit per unit of underlying reserves,
It/Rt, becomes the appropriate investment criterion; and Equation (3)
must be rewritten as:
n. V/R 1 - g(n.)
(5) = ; for all i and j.
n. V./RJ 1 - g(nj)
Equation (5) describes the configuration of bids that would obtain
under a regime of physically-constrained bidding. A pattern of uniform
competition is extremely unlikely here, but perhaps somewhat more plau-
sible than in the unconstrained bidding case. Such a pattern could
now prevail if unit mineral rents (Vi/Ri) were constant over all tracts.
However, the existence of pronounced economies of scale in reservoir
development effectively rules out this possibility.
In general, the competitive disparities required to equilibrate
profit opportunities among tracts are necessarily less dramatic than
underlying disparities in tract values. This follows directly from
Equations (3) - (5), each of which requires:
n. V.
(6) 1 < z < z i i(6) 1. .. 1 for V. > V..n. V. J
J J
Thus, a tract bearing twice as many reserves is generally expected to
draw fewer than twice as many competitors. The ¢c: tclnt t which
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competitive variations are damped in this fashion differs among the
three behavioral specifications. A regime of budget-constrained bidding
suppresses such fluctuations entirely (i.e., ni = n). At the other
extreme is unconstrained bidding, which generates the widest differences
among tracts. Somewhere in between lies the case of bidding subject to
physical constraints. These distinctive theoretical results provide a
new basis for investigating the empirical validity of the alternative
behavioral hypotheses.
4. Empirical Evidence
We now consider available evidence regarding the three hypothesized
modes of bidding: financially constrained, physically constrained, and
unconstrained. We specifically examine the correspondence between empiri-
cal patterns of competition and underlying variations in tract value to
determine which behavioral model is most consistent with historical
experience.
The hypothesis least consistent with recent history is that bidding
has been subject to financial constraints. Whereas this hypothesis
implies the absence of systematic variation in the degree of competi-
tion, the data clearly show the opposite. Recent analyses of the leasing
market reveal that the degree of competition is highly correlated with
virtually all measures of tract quality investigated. For example, a
Geological Survey 11978] study of eight sales finds a statistically
significant positive correlation between the number of bidders per
tract and each of: (a) the probability that the tract attains some
production, (b) the probability that the tract attains flush produc-
tion, and (c) gross production revenue. A separate study by Gribbin
et al [1979] shows that the simple correlation exceeds 90% between
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number of bidders per tract and each of: (a) speed of development,
(b) the probability the tract will be drilled, and (c) the probability
the tract will be productive. Additional corroborating evidence regard-
ing the correlation between number of bidders and underlying reserve
volumes is presented later in this section. The combined weight of
this evidence would seem to establish that bidders are attracted to
tracts of high quality and value. The hypothesis that bidders have
been constrained by a lack of funds is therefore contradicted.
The two remaining hypotheses (physically constrained versus uncon-
strained bidding) are both consistent with the general tendency of the
more valuable properties to foster greater competition. However,
the hypothesis of unconstrained bidding predicts relatively wide varia-
tions in the degree of competition to acquire dissimilar tracts. We
focus on this distinction to see which hypothesis provides a better
account of actual fluctuations in the degree of competition.
To proceed, we must adopt a more specific model of the lease sale.
First, we specify a particular valuation model for petroleum reserves,
of the form:
(7) Vt =ar ; t = 1, ..., T.
t t
Parameter E is an index of scale economies in reserve development. Its
value may be presumed to exceed unity since it is known that a greater
deposit size enhances the net economic value of each barrel of reserves.
We further assume that the behavior of the winning bid relative
to tract value, g(n) = B(n)/V, follows the relationship:
(8) g(n) = - ;
... where - represents an arbitrary constant.
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Equation (8) represents the case where the force of competition causes
the expected value of the winning bid ultimately to converge to the
value of the tract. The parameter y determines the speed of this
convergence.
Substituting from Equations (7) and (8) into (3), we can write
explicitly the necessary condition for an unconstrained bidding equili-
brium:
.(9) - = ; for all i and j.n.R
Similarly, the condition for a physically constrained bidding equili-
brium becomes:
e-1
n. R. 2
(10) = for all i and j.
n.
Equations (9) and (10) offer alternative explanations of competi-
tive fluctuations in terms of underlying variations in the volume of
petroleum reserves. The predicted amplitude of competitive fluctua-
tions differs markedly between the two models, depending on the extent
of scale economies. This difference provides an opportunity for empirical
study. For example, if the degree of scale economies () were specified,
we could then identify the predicted amplitude of competitive fluctua-
tions, and determine which model conforms more closely to actual experi-
ence. Conversely, we can use actual fluctuations to estimate the extent
of economies of scale from the following equation:
1This convergence property has been shown by Wilson [1976] to apply to
a rather wide class of game-theoretic bidding models.
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(11) ln(n./nj) = S ln(Ri/Rj).
In conjunction with the hypothesis of unconstrained bidding, [Equation
(9)], Equation (11) provides an estimate of the scale parameter:
E = 2. In conjunction with the constrained bidding hypothesis [Equation
(10)], a larger estimate is implied: = 2 + 1. The plausibility
of the alternative hypotheses may then be judged in terms of their
respective implications regarding the magnitude of economies of scale,
about which we do have some prior notions.
To implement this approach, we have estimated Equation (11) on
the basis of data from two recent OCS sales. The data reporting number
of bidders per tract (ni) are taken from the U.S. Geological Survey
[1978]. Estimates of the volume of reserves underlying each tract
(Ri) have been provided to the author by a major U.S. oil company.
These data reflect the corporate geologists' best estimates, as of
the date of sale, of the recoverable reserves of each of 43 tracts
let in OCS sale #35, and an additional 16 tracts let in OCS sale #37.
Both sales were held during 1975.
The data from both sales indicate a significant positive corre-
lation between the perceived volume of reserves and the number of
competitors drawn to each tract. The simple correlation between the
two variables is 0.32 in the case of sale #35, and 0.21 in the case of
sale #37. However, it is the non-linear correlation expressed by
Equation (11) that is of most interest. Estimates of the coefficient
a and related estimates of derived from Equation (11) are reported
in Table 1. The estimates were obtained by a conventional application
of generalized least squares that is described in the appendix.
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TABLE 1: ESTIMATES OF THE SCALE PARAMETER
Estimated returns to scale ()
B Unconstrained Constrained
0.24
(0.11)
0.37
(0.23)
0.48
(0.22)
0.74
(0.46)
1.48
(0.22) (standard errors)
1.74
(0.46) (standard errors)
Notes: Parameter 5 is estimated from the equation: ln(ni/nj) =
a'ln(R./R.), as discussed in the appendix.
The returA to scale implied by the unconstrained bidding
hypothesis is determined from = 2.
The return to scale implied by the constrained bidding hypo-
thesis is determined from E = 2- + 1.
Sale #35:
Sale #37:
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The principal conclusion from Table 1 is that the hypothesis of
unconstrained bidding is inconsistent with the phenomenon of increasing
returns to scale, and therefore implausible. The implication of decreas-
ing returns is supported at the 95% significance level in sale #35
(c = 0.48); and again at the 70% level in sale #37 ( = 0.74), where
only 16 observations were available for analysis.
If we reinterpret the same data from the alternative point of view
(i.e., constrained bidding), the conclusion is reversed: returns to
scale are estimated to be 148% in sale #35 and 174% in sale #37. Scale
economies of this magnitude are eminently plausible, at least regarding
the development of offshore petroleum reserves; so the results in Table
1 must be said to favor the hypothesis that bidding is subject to physical
constraints.
The apparent difference in scale economies which arises between the
two sales (148% vs. 174%) is not in itself a cause for alarm. In fact,
such a difference should have been expected since one sale (#37) con-
sisted primarily of gas deposits and the other (#35) consisted primarily
of oil. Regarding the difference between the two minerals, Mansvelt
Beck and Wiig 11977, p. 90] have concluded that economies of scale are
"much more pronounced" for gas fields than for oil fields, due to the
nature of the transportation problem. Thus, the difference which
appears between sales #35 and #37 is in the expected direction and
actually increases our confidence in the validity of the model. It
does appear that the only hypothesis consistent with available evidence
is that firms individually pursue limited volumes of reserves, and
therefore seek to maximize expected profit opportunities per unit of
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underlying reserves. Both alternative hypotheses (unconstrained bidding
and budget-constrained bidding) are strongly contradicted by the data
and must be rejected.
5. Conclusions
The empirical results presented above shed new light on an old
question. For years policymakers have suspected capital barriers of
restricting competition in OCS lease sales. Fear of capital barriers
is perhaps the only convincing explanation that can be given for the
continued toleration of joint bidding ventures, which alleviate the
capital burdens placed on individual firms. Most recently, the Congress
has amended the United States Code [1978] to require the Secretary of
Energy to further reduce capital requirements by instituting new and
fundamentally different leasing procedures designed to alleviate front-
end capital expenditures (e.g., profit-share bidding, royalty bidding,
sequential bidding).
Our results suggest that the main effect of these revisions in
leasing procedure may be to address a problem that is largely non-
existent by imposing new administrative and informational costs on
both the government and industry. This conclusion must be regarded
as preliminary since our results, although fairly robust with respect
to model specificaiton, are based on a small sample of data from only
two OCS sales. Nevertheless, the results clearly invite further research
Incentive-compatible schemes based on royalty and profit-share bidding
are remarkably more information intensive than the present form of
bonus bidding, in contradiction to the House Conference Committee's
stated objective of "limiting administrative burdens on government
and industry" [1978, p. 92].
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on the possibility that capital barriers are of less significance than
the Congress has been led to believe.
More important than our empirical results is the conceptual notion
that good reasons do exist for fluctuations in the degree of competi-
tion in OCS lease sales. Too often attention has been focused on tracts
that draw relatively few (one or two) bidders, the implication being
that this degree of competition is insufficient to return fair market
value to the government. As we have demonstrated, however, tracts of
relatively low quality will quite properly fail to inspire maximum
competition, even in a market that is fully competitive. OCS sale
#5 is a good example of this phenomenon. Each of the 23 tracts let
in sale #5 drew exactly one bid, thus raising concern about the receipt
of fair market value. Yet, after 21 years, none of the 23 tracts has
produced any oil or gas. Limited competition will suffice when fair
market value is zero. The reader should not think that such occur-
rences are uncommon; of the 388 one-bidder tracts let prior to 1970,
only 26% have yielded any production. In contrast, 48% of the tracts
drawing four or more bidders have yielded some production, as shown
by Gribbin, et al [1979].
Because of the extreme heterogeneity of offshore tracts, it makes
little sense to speak of the average degree of competition exhibited
in OCS sales, and even less to adopt this measure as an explicit target
of public policy. Yet, the average level of competition continues to
receive the primary attention of policymakers. During its latest
round of policymaking, the Congress was again distracted from exten-
sive economic evidence that OCS lease sales have consistently returned
fair market value to the overnment (see, for :li, ;iu ,-,t So(?it;;)
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and Jones [1976], and Erickson and Spann [1974]) by the observation
that throughout the history of OCS leasing the average level of com-
petition has remained at less than four bidders per tract. There is
no doubt that a fundamental misinterpretation of the significance of
this simple statistic motivated Congress' demand for schemes to increase
the level of competition, and imparted a major new direction to U.S.
leasing policy.
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APPENDIX: THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Consistent with the discussion in the text, the presumed depen-
dence of the degree of competition on tract quality can be written in
logarithmic form:
(Al) ln(ni ) = ln[ni(R)] + vi , for i = 1, ..., T;
... where R denotes a vector comprising the reserve volumes
of the T distinct tracts, (R1, ..., RT); and the vi are
assumed to be independent and identically distributed,
N(O,o2).
The logarithmic differential in competition between tracts is determined
by subtraction:
(A2) ln(ni) - ln(nj) = ln[ni(R)] - ln[nj(R)] + (vi-vj); for all i and j.
The appropriate functional form of Equation (A2) is derived from theo-
retical principles in section 4 of the text, giving:
(A3) ln(ni ) - ln(nj) = B'[ln(Ri)-ln(Rj)] + (vi-vj); for all i and j.
Equation (A3) is a suitable estimating equation for 3, except that
the residual covariance matrix is heteroscedastic and serially correlated.
Generalized least squares could be applied, but the non-symmetry of the
residual covariance matrix makes this procedure laborious.
An alternative estimating equation may be derived from Equation
(A3) by summing over index j and dividing by the total number of tracts.
This yields:
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(A4) ln(n) - ln[G(n)] = B.{ln(R) - ln[G(R)]} + (vi-v);
for i = 1, ... , T;
... where G(x) denotes the sample geometric mean of variable
x, and v denotes the arithmetic mean of the v.
1
The residual covariance matrix of Equation (A4) is symmetric and of the
2 U'form: a I- -], where I denotes the TxT identity matrix and denotes
the T-element column vector consisti:g entirely of ones. The parameter
estimates reported in the text were obtained by applying the method of
generalized least squares to Equation (A4).
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